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A
n understanding of what drives the partici-
pation rate is necessary for the projection
of labour force growth, a key input into the de-
termination of the economy’s production poten-
tial.1 The sharp drop in the participation rate in
Canada in the 1990s has given rise to consider-
able debate about its cause and if it was reason-
able to have expected it to have returned to its
pre-recession peak. If that peak is the appropri-
ate reference point, then the implications are
that labour market slack is considerably larger
than the present unemployment rate suggests.
While the severity of the 1990-91 recession in
Canada and the subsequent underachievement of
real GDP relative to potential caused much of the
decline and subsequent stagnation of the aggre-
gate participation rate, structural developments
and compositional shifts among various sub-
groups of the population of labour force age,
which were under way before 1989, also exerted
downward pressure. The purpose of this article is
to identify those supply side developments that
could have accounted for part of the decline in the
participation rate since 1989.2 Although this ap-
proach does not include an analysis of demand
side factors, cyclical effects are noted. The much
worse performance of the Canadian participation
rate than its U.S. counterpart in the 1990s, after
the similarities of the preceding 15 years, suggests
that using the U.S. labour market experience as a
benchmark for Canada may shed some light on
the situation, especially since the United States
has been operating at full capacity for some time.
Econometric estimation of participation rates is
hampered by the presence of many influences
that are difficult to measure, such as changes in
the availability of private and public pension
plans, family relationships and structures, and the
costs of and subsidies to education.3 If these influ-
ences cannot be specifically modelled, projec-
tions based on such estimations will be unreli-
able. Fortin and Fortin (1999) estimated the
aggregate participation rate, using a quadratic
time trend to capture the effects of such influ-
ences, but they noted the problems of this tech-
nique in “appraising future non-policy structural
developments in labour force participation.”
Thus, predictions based on econometric estima-
tion must often be supplemented by judgment. In
this paper, judgment about the effect of the vari-
ous supply side factors on the participation rates
of the major sub-groups, leads to projections of
these rates, given a moderately expanding econ-
omy.
From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, the
behaviour in the aggregate participation rates of
both Canada and the United States were broadly
similar (Chart 1), rising to record highs by the end
of the 1980s with only one significant interruption
in the early 1980s.4 The dominant influence on
the aggregate participation rates of both countries
was the strong upward trend in women’s partici-
pation rates that had begun in the 1950s (Chart 2).
Chart 1 Participation rates and employment rates,
Canada and the United States
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  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   1 Male participation rates fell slightly over the
1980s (Chart 3).
The 1990s, however, appear to have initiated a
radical departure in the evolution of the participa-
tion and employment rates in the two countries.
Both these rates fell more in Canada than in the
United States during the 1990-91 recession, partly
because economic growth was relatively stronger
in Canada than in the United States before 1990
and the recession of 1990-91 was more severe.
However, while the U.S. participation rate had be-
gun to recover by 1994 and has since risen to a
new high, the Canadian rate continued to fall until
1995 and showed no sign of recovery until 1998.
In the United States, female rates are once again
responsible for the rise in the total participation
rate as those for male rates have drifted down
since 1992. The rate of increase of the female par-
ticipation rate has, however, been considerably
lower than in the 1980s. In Canada, female rates
were almost one percentage point higher in 1998
than in 1995 but the further slippage in male rates
offset much of this uptick.
Cyclical influences can account for short-run
changes in the both male and female participation
rates in the two countries. For example, over the
past two decades or so, the rates either fell or
stalled in the recessions. The response to recover-
ies is, however, less clear. In the United States, the
rate of increase in female rates slowed in each of
the expansions of the 1980s and the 1990s, while
at the same time male rates continued to decline.
In Canada, female rate increases also moderated
during the vigorous expansion of the 1980s, while
male rates stalled and both have been fairly flat
since 1994. Structural factors are more likely to have
been behind such longer term developments.
We examine first some of the demographic fac-
tors that may have influenced the aggregate par-
ticipation rate. We then undertake a disaggre-
grated analysis of some of the possible structural
influences on major age and gender groupings for
both Canada and the United States. The groups
considered are the core labour force (ages 25-54),
youth (ages 15-19 and 20-24) and older people
(age 55 and over). Our main conclusion is that an
increase in the aggregate participation rate should
be expected over the medium term, but it is un-
likely to return to its 1989 peak level or to track the
U.S. rate as closely. The greatest uncertainty sur-
rounds the direction of the participation rate for




The participation rate fell by 2.7 percentage
points from 1989 to 1997 in Canada compared
with an increase of 0.5 percentage points in the
United States. Although much of this difference is
because of Canada’s worse cyclical performance,
some of it may be explained by demographic de-
velopments and shifts in the composition of the
population of labour force age.
Chart 3 Male participation rates in Canada and the
United States
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Chart 2 Female participation rates in Canada and the
United States
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Since 1976, the population of working age has
grown at a faster pace in Canada than in the
United States primarily because of our higher rate
of immigration (Table 1). Until 1989, however, the
labour force (and employment) grew faster in
both countries because of an increase in the par-
ticipation rates. In the 1990s population growth
accelerated in Canada, exceeding the increase in
the labour force, which had slowed markedly but
less than employment. By contrast, population
growth decelerated in the United States and even
though labour force growth also slowed it contin-
ued to outstrip population growth. Even if em-
ployment and the labour force had posted the
same increase as they had in the United States, the
participation rate would still have fallen by about
one percentage point, assuming the population
growth remained as it was.
In order to have matched the performance of
the U.S. participation rate for 1989 to 1997, Can-
ada’s labour force would have had to increase by
almost 14 per cent, implying a similar growth in
employment, assuming the previous relationship
between the labour force and employment
growth was maintained. While, faster population
growth can be expected to give rise to faster eco-
nomic growth and, therefore, higher employment
and participation rates, the acceleration in the rate
of new entrants to the labour market may have
been more than the economy could immediately
absorb, in an era of record downsizing in both the
private and public sector.
Compositional Effects
At any point in time, the aggregate participa-
tion rate, which is a ratio of the labour force to the
population of working age, is the current
weighted average of the widely varying participa-
tion rates of the different age/sex groups. Each of
these groups may be subject to different sociologi-
cal and economic influences, which may change
over time. For example, the decisions of college
students to work may be influenced by the avail-
ability of grants, loans and subsidies to education.
Many older people’s decisions about permanent
withdrawal from the labour market may be af-
fected by the existence of public or private pen-
sion plans. The ages for peak participation in the
labour force are 25 to 44 years (a rate of more than
80 per cent since the beginning of the 1980s).
Rates for the 20-24 age group were fairly similar
until 1989. Teenagers’ rates are considerably
lower than any of the groups aged 20-54. Rates
drop dramatically after age 54 but particularly af-
ter 64, when they are less than 10 per cent.
Because there have been major swings in birth
rates since the 1920s, the population shares of
these various age groups have changed signifi-
cantly since 1976. Such changes have the poten-
tial to affect the aggregate participation rate even
if the specific age group participation rates were to
remain unchanged. The major development has
been the replacement of the aging baby boomers
(those born from 1946 to 1965) by the baby bust
generation over the past two decades. The first
baby boomers passed age 44 in 1991 and were re-
placed in the 25-44 age group by the first of the
baby bust generation (those born after 1965). But
other cohorts are also having an impact. For ex-
ample, people born in the low birth rate Depres-
sion years entered the 65 and over group in 1995.
It is the combination of the shifts in movements of
relatively small age groups that may have an ef-
fect on the aggregate participation rate but for
simplicity we focus here on three broad groups.
The core group, which is aged 25 to 54, rose
from about 50 per cent to 51 per cent of the work-
TABLE 1 The American and Canadian labour market
Per cent change
United States Canada 
Population of
working age Labour force Employment
Population of
working age Labour force Employment
1976-79 5.6 9.2 11.4 6.2 10.4 10.1
1979-89 13.1 18.0 18.7 15.3 21.7 21.6
1989-97 9.0 11.4 10.4 13.0 8.5 6.5
  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   3 ing age population in the mid-1970s to about 58
per cent in 1996 in both Canada and the United
States, with most of the growth having occurred
in the 1980s.5 Since the participation rate of this
age group is higher than that of youth and of peo-
ple aged 55 and over, it plays a major role in deter-
mining the level of the aggregate participation
rate. However, the drop of about half a percentage
point in its participation rate from 1989 to 1997
accounted for less than 10 per cent of the drop in
the aggregate rate over that period.
In contrast, the youth share (ages 15-24 in Can-
ada and 16-24 in the United States) fell dramati-
cally in the 1980s as the baby boomers completed
their passage through this age group. In Canada
the share dropped from more than 26 per cent in
the 1970s to 19 per cent by the end of the 1980s
and to under 17 per cent by the mid-1990s. In
spite of being only about a third of the size of the
population aged 25-54 in 1989 and a decline of
about 2.5 percentage points in its population
weight in the 1990s, the drop in the youth partici-
pation rate in Canada after the 1990-91 recession
accounted for almost 60 per cent of the fall in the
aggregate participation rate from 1989 to 1997.6
The participation rates for the 55 and over age
group, are very low relative to younger age
groups, particularly in the case of females. The
rate of permanent departure from the labour force
picks up after age 55 and accelerates rapidly after
age 65. Currently in Canada the participation
rates for men fall from 73 per cent in the 55 to 59
age group to only 16 per cent for ages 65 to 69. A
similar pattern is observed for women, whose
participation rates are considerably lower. The
share in the population of working age of the 55
and over group has risen from 22 per cent in 1976 to
about 25 per cent in the mid-1990s. Because of their
longer life expectancy, the share of older women is
significantly higher than that of older men.
An estimation of the compositional effects can
be made by keeping the participation rates con-
stant for a base year. Chart 4 illustrates the effect
of weighting the 1976 participation rates of major
age groups by each year’s population shares.
From 1976 to 1984, the effects of compositional
changes in the labour force population on the ag-
gregate participation rate were roughly neutral,
but since then the effect has been increasingly
negative. Compositional changes are estimated to
have accounted for about one percentage point,
or about one third, of the overall decline in the ag-
gregate participation rate from 1989 to 1997.7
Dugan and Robidoux (1999) make a similar esti-
mate for the United States and find the effect of
compositional changes was almost neutral from
1989 to 1996.8 The move of the baby boomers into
the 55-plus group in the next decade is projected
to raise the share of this age group in the popula-
tion of working age to almost 30 per cent by 2006
and its compositional effect on the aggregate par-
ticipation rate will become much larger after 2000
(Chart 5).
Chart 5 Projected Canadian participation rate
Projected participation rate
with age groups at 1997 levels
Actual participation
rate










Chart 4 Participation rates and the effect of changes in
the age composition of the Canadian population
Actual With participation rates of age groups fixed
at 1976 levels
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and non-students
The youth population comprises students and
non-students with very different participation
rates. Although many full-time students work or
search for work during the school year, they are
less likely than non-students to be participating in
the labour force. Even at the peak of economic ac-
tivity in the 1980s, the participation rate for stu-
dents in Canada was only half that of non-stu-
dents.9 Thus, a rise in attendance rates will
produce a lower overall youth participation rate,
other things being equal.10 In Canada the full-
time school attendance rate rose to more than 58
per cent in 1997 from 50 per cent in 1989 (Chart
6), which, according to one estimate, accounted
for about 50 per cent of the decline in the youth
participation rate from 1989 to 1997.11
The rise from 1989 to 1997 in the full-time
school attendance rate in Canada for teens was
only about half the increase experienced by
young adults. It therefore had a much smaller ef-
fect on the teens’ than on the young adults’ par-
ticipation rate, accounting for only about 20 per
cent of the decline in the participation rate of
teens compared with 90 per cent of the decline in
the rate of young adults (Jennings, 1998).
For both the 16-19 and the 20-24 age groups the
rise in attendance rates was larger in Canada than
in the United States in 1989-97 according to a
measure that includes part-time students.12 From
being roughly equal in 1989, the teen rate rose
seven percentage points for Canada compared
with 4.9 percentage points for the United States.
The attendance rate for those aged 20-24 was one
percentage point higher in Canada than in the
United States in 1989 and rose 10.9 percentage
points compared with 7.2 percentage points in the
United States. If most of the rise in the United
States were structural, then using it as a bench-
mark, the extra growth in Canada may be inter-
preted as a cyclical response. These assumptions,
however, imply that the rise in youth school atten-
dance rates do not account for any of the differ-
ence between the falls in the participation rates of
the two countries.
Faster growth in the attendance rates as the em-
ployment rate fell between 1989 and 1992 indi-
cates that, particularly for teens, they do respond
to cyclical developments. The incentive to stay in
school is likely stronger when there are fewer low-
skill job opportunities, and these opportunities
tend to be sensitive to the business cycle. The
1990-91 recession had a disproportionate effect
on teenagers encouraging many to stay in school.
Data on school attendance in the United States are
available from the late 1940s, whereas in Canada,
they go back only to 1976. From an examination
of the U.S. data cyclical effects appear to be small
relative to longer-term trends.
The recent growth in U.S. male attendance
rates was a continuation of an upward movement
dating back to the beginning of the 1980s, after a
fall related to the Vietnam War had petered out.
By the mid-1990s, rates were in the region of the
previous peaks and appear to be still holding. Fe-
male rates, on the other hand, have been rising
very steadily in the United States for 50 years and
have now virtually converged with their male
counterparts. Strong gains were posted by all but
16- and 17 year olds. These developments suggest
that the rise in the school attendance rate is
largely structural. The Canadian experience has
been similar to that of the United States since the
early 1980s. Women’s rates grew more strongly
than men’s. Teen rates have begun to flatten out in
recent years but young adults’ rates have contin-
ued to rise. It therefore seems reasonable to as-
sume that some of the longer-term characteristics
of the U.S. experience, especially for women, are
present also in Canada and that a large share of
the increase in the attendance rate in the 1990s
was likely structural.
Further evidence of the structural nature of the
increase in school attendance rates is the fact that
Chart 6 Full-time students as a proportion of population
of same age in Canada













  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   5 they rose in the 1980s in both countries, even as
employment rates increased, perhaps responding
to factors such as the continuing shift in demand
from low- to higher-skilled jobs.
The premium paid to workers with higher lev-
els of education is one incentive to spend more
years in school. Since, in Canada, there is little
evidence these premiums have increased since
the 1970s, they do not account for the rising trend
in attendance rates (Bar-Or et. al., 1995, Beaudry
and Green, 1997). The failure for these premiums
to rise may be because the supply of educated
youth has been growing faster than the demand
for such workers. Nevertheless, the lower unem-
ployment rate for those with higher levels of edu-
cation13 may be a sufficiently strong incentive for
relatively more young people to choose to stay in
school and thus improve their employment pros-
pects.14
Interpreting the differences between Canadian
and U.S. school attendance rate increases from
1989 to 1997 as the cyclical component of the Ca-
nadian increase implies that for teens the struc-
tural increase in the attendance rate accounted for
about 1.75 percentage points, or 15 per cent, of
the 12 percentage point fall in their participation
rate. For young adults the structural component
would account for 3.4 percentage points, or 60 per
cent, of the drop of 5.7 percentage points in their
participation rate. These two effects combined ap-
pear to account for about 0.4 percentage points of






The disaggregrated data for the three age
groups considered here show that the similarity
before 1990 between the aggregate Canadian and
U.S. participation rate levels and trends extended
to most sub-groups. Even beyond 1990 there were
remarkable similarities in some groups though
the aggregate rates were so different.
The core labour force: ages 25-54
For the core labour force group as a whole
(aged 25-54), the steeply rising trend in the female
participation rates in the 1970s and 1980s out-
weighed the declining trend in the rates for men.
In the 1990s, however, the rate for women flat-
tened out in Canada and slowed considerably in
the United States, while the decline in the rate for
men picked up (Chart 7). Because this group has
a strong attachment to the labour force, its partici-
pation rate is relatively insensitive to changes in
the business cycle.
Since the 1981-82 recession, Canadians have
stayed in the labour force almost to the same de-
gree that Americans have — both men and
women — while employment rates have gener-
ally been much lower in Canada. This indicates
that Canadian adults have a stronger attachment
to the labour force. The similarity in participation
rates in the 1990s is particularly remarkable, tak-

































  6  Canadian Business Economics   Summer 1999 ing into account the more severe recession in Can-
ada in 1990-91 and the subsequent weaker expan-
sion. This stronger attachment may have been be-
cause of the higher probability that an
unemployed worker in Canada will be receiving
Unemployment Insurance (now called Employ-
ment Insurance). Apart from the incentive to re-
main active in the labour market in order to qual-
ify for benefits, recipients of EI have to be
searching for work and are, therefore, likely to re-
port in the Labour Force Survey that they are seek-
ing work when they are not employed.16 Changes
to EI since 1989 have helped to more than halve
the probability that a non-working individual will
receive benefits and to almost eliminate the differ-
ence between the two countries’ probabilities.
There may, however, be some inertia in the par-
ticipation rate response to these changes in Can-
ada but eventually the tighter eligibility rules, es-
pecially as they apply to seasonal workers, may
bring the relationship between employment and
participation rates in Canada closer to that of the
United States. Another factor that tends to raise
the participation rate in Canada relative to that of
the United States is that, in Canada, just looking at
job ads qualifies an individual for inclusion in the
labour force. If the U.S. definition were used, the
participation rate in Canada would be about 0.5
per cent lower.17
In the case of male participation rates, the con-
tinuation of the long-term downward trend after
1976 appears to be the result of a permanent nega-
tive reaction to recessions. Although not easily
apparent from Chart 7, a closer examination of the
data reveals that the shift to a lower level in the
early 1980s was permanent in the United States,
while there was a partial recovery in Canada. Af-
ter 1989, the decline lasted until 1995 followed by
a marginal increase in both countries. Although
U.S. employment rates are now at about the same
level as they were in 1984-87, the participation
rate is two percentage points lower and 2.5 per-
centage points below its 1979 level, in spite of the
sustained strong expansion. This inertia in the
U.S. participation rate suggests structural factors
at work, which may also be present in Canada.
Nevertheless, it is unclear why the male partici-
pation rate has been on a declining trend for so
long in Canada and the United States as well as
other industrial countries.18 Accordingly, there is
a great deal of uncertainty about the future direc-
tion and size of movement for this group.
One possible explanation for the downward
trend in the male participation rate is rooted in the
rising skill levels required for workers in many
sectors. When men with limited skills are laid off
from traditional, well-paid jobs in goods-produc-
ing industries, they may take a long time to adjust
their wage rate expectations to the level their ex-
perience and skill level can command in an envi-
ronment where technological change has made
many skills obsolete. Many of these men, unable
to find “suitable” jobs, drop out of the labour
force. Those who can take advantage of early re-
tirement options may opt for permanent with-
drawal. Others may switch roles with spouses,
frequently moving in and out of the labour force.
In Canada, declines in the participation rate for
workers with fewer than eight years of education
have been greater than those for groups with
higher levels of education. Although some of this
difference can be attributed to the harsher impact
of a weak economy on the least skilled, the U.S.
experience suggests a longer-term effect may be
operating. The rise since the early 1980s of school
attendance rates of young men in both countries
may eventually outweigh the negative effect of
layoffs and early retirements and lead to a reversal
of the long-term downward trend in the rate for
adult men.
The rising trend in the participation rates of
women in 1976-89, continued a trend that began
in the early 1950s. Strong demand for occupations
that women were able to fill interacted with vari-
ous sociological and economic factors that were
evident in both the United States and Canada, as
well as many other industrial countries: changes
in societal attitudes toward working women, par-
ticularly those with family responsibilities; the
larger percentage of women with post-secondary
education; and the more ambitious career aspira-
tions of many women. As a result of these factors,
each generation of women has spent more time in
the labour force than the preceding one, pushing
up the core participation rate. The marked slow-
down in the rate of growth of the U.S. participa-
tion rate over the 1990s, in the face of continuing
robust expansion, raises the question as to
whether this ratcheting-up process is nearing a
limit and that the flattening out of the Canadian
female participation rate was partly the result of
structural factors, which will restrain further
growth in the future.19
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ens the case that, while this process is not yet
over, additional ratcheting upward will be much
smaller. In the United States, participation rates
for women with children under 18 have been ris-
ing faster than those of other women, with the re-
sult there has been a considerable shrinking of the
difference between the rates of these two
groups.20 The other source of growth in the rate
for U.S. core-age women since the mid-1980s has
been in the group aged 45-54 without children.
The degree of convergence of the rates for these
sub-groups, as well as the rates for men and
women, has already been considerable. In addi-
tion, the proportion of the year that women have
been spending in the workforce on average has
now reached 11 months compared with 11.5
months for men.21 These developments indicate
there is less room for growth in the participation
rate for women aged 25-54. Similar movements
appear to have been taking place in Canada. In
fact, the rate for women aged 25-44 is now higher
in Canada than in the United States. However, the
rate for the 45-54 age group in Canada, which rose
significantly in the 1990s, is still below that for
U.S. women of the same age and below that for
Canadian women aged 25-44. There may, thus, be
more room for the participation rate of Canadian
women to rise than for women in the United
States, despite the fact that the rates for Canadian
and U.S. core-age women were virtually identical
in 1997.
One explanation for the tendency for women’s
participation rates to increase while men’s stag-
nate or decline may be that women are more flex-
ible over the kind of jobs they will fill. For exam-
ple, there is some evidence women’s greater
willingness to take low-paying jobs, for which
they are overqualified, while they are juggling
work and domestic duties.22 The relatively
greater rise in full-time school attendance rate for
young women than for young men, may also be
responsible for a stronger influence on the partici-
pation rate for women in the core group.
In Canada, changes to EI may eventually
weaken labour force attachment with the result
that a cyclical increase in the overall employment
rate for those in the core group may not be accom-
panied by as much of a rise in the participation
rate. By 2006 the participation rate of the core-age
group appears to have room to move to about
three percentage points above the 1996 level but
only if male rates rise slightly (say by one percent-
age point). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics as-
sumes the male rate in the United States will de-
cline over the next decade, and projects a 1.7
percentage point increase in the total core-age rate
from 1996 to 2006 (Fullerton, 1997: Table 4).
Youth: Ages 24 and under
Participation rates are more cyclical for youths
than for adults but, if a large part of the increase in
school attendance rate is structural, the participa-
tion rates may not return to the peak level of the
late 1980s any time soon. For the United States,
that development would be a continuation of a
pattern that was evident in the 1980s for teens and
men aged 20-24.
Teens: 19 years and under
The labour market experiences of teens (15-19
in Canada, 16-19 in the United States) and young
adults (20-24) are sufficiently different to warrant
separate treatment here.23
In both Canada and the United States, the at-
tachment of teenagers to the labour force is rela-
tively weak, driven largely by job opportunities.
Their participation rates are, therefore, very cycli-
cal, tracking their employment rate very closely
for some time (Charts 8 and 9). This is not surpris-
ing since, during the school year, most teens are in
school full-time and thus available for few hours
of work each week.25
Chart 8 Participation and employment rates, both sexes,
in Canada and the United States 
Note: Canadian data for 15-19 year olds; U.S. data for 16-19 year olds.
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aged group was lower in Canada than in the
United States in the 1970s, it had caught up by the
beginning of the 1980s and overtaken the U.S. rate
by the end of the decade. The relatively stronger
expansion in Canada was a significant factor in
the latter occurrence. The drop in participation
rates in the 1990-91 recession, though significant
in both countries, was much more severe in Can-
ada and, while the rates began to recover some-
what in the United States after 1992, they contin-
ued to fall in Canada. Nevertheless, the U.S. rates
have not returned to their pre-recession levels,
suggesting structural factors may be playing a
role.
As the increase in full-time school attendance
in Canada can account for only a small part of the
decline in the participation rate, most of the de-
cline stemmed from falling participation rates for
students and non-students. The participation rate
for teenage students in Canada fell about 12 per-
centage points between 1989 and 1997, reflecting
a particularly difficult job market for these young
people, one that was much more severe for both
students and non-students than for older youths
(Statistics Canada, 1997). The performance of
teen participation rates in the summer months en-
forces this view (Chart 9). In addition to the weak-
ness of the economy, Canadian students may also
have been affected by the restructuring in sectors
that traditionally provided the kind of part-time or
summer jobs filled by teenagers, such as retail,
which accounts for about 25 per cent of student
employment.
Canadian teenagers who are not in school have
also had difficulty finding jobs in the 1990s.25
Their participation rate fell by almost seven per-
centage points during the recession, and by 1997
it had recovered by only two percentage points.
Apart from the cyclical effect, the shrinking per-
centage of jobs that now require more than a basic
level of literacy may have negatively affected the
search intensity of both United States and Cana-
dian teens.26 The increases in payroll taxes, in-
cluding the extension of EI premiums to all hours
worked, may also have discouraged job search
among Canadian teens. The rise in the minimum
wage in Canada relative to the average wage in
the 1990s, in contrast to its decline from the mid-
1970s until the mid-1980s, may have had a nega-
tive effect on the demand side of the labour mar-
ket, which in turn dampened the supply side. The
Chart 9 Summer participation rates, Canada 
Note: Data not seasonally adjusted.












































  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   9 evidence on the impact of minimum wages is,
however, mixed.27
As in the past, the business cycle and labour
costs will heavily influence the demand side of
the teen labour market. On the other hand, the
structural changes that have taken place in some
sectors in Canada, such as retail, and the in-
creases in payroll taxes may permanently depress
both the demand and supply in the teen labour
market. While part of the rise in the school atten-
dance rate was cyclical, the structural increase
will still have a small permanent impact on the
overall participation rate. A recapture of at least 75
per cent of the drop in the teen participation rate
since 1989 should be possible as the economy
moves to full capacity. The BLS, on the other
hand, is projecting a decline of over 3 percentage
points for the 16-19 age group by 2006 in the
United States (Fullerton, 1997: Table 4).
Young adults: Ages 20 to 24
Although employment rates for young male
and female adults in both countries are just as cy-
clical as those for teens, their participation rates
have been considerably less cyclical, particularly
before the 1990s (Chart 10). The looser relation-
ship between employment and participation rates
of young adults relative to teenagers is because of
the much larger proportion of non-students in the
young adult group. Non-students have a greater
attachment to the labour force than do students.
The trends of participation rates for young
adults have been broadly similar in the two coun-
tries since the mid-1970s. In the late 1980s, male
participation rates weakened, while female rates
were rising strongly. Male employment rates, on
the other hand, were sufficiently weaker in Can-
ada than in the United States after the early 1980s
to raise questions about how long the Canadian
participation rate could continue to track the U.S.
rate. Female participation rates were significantly
higher in Canada than in the United States until
the 1990s, which was consistent with a higher
employment rate.
The absolute decline in the male participation
rate in Canada from 1989 to 1992 was much larger
than in the United States, resulting in the first di-
vergence in male rates in more than 10 years and
a convergence in female rates. (As the U.S. female
employment and participation rates have recov-
ered since 1994, they have moved above the Ca-
nadian rates for the first time since the mid-
1970s.) Since the rise in school attendance rates
apparently accounted for much of the weakness
in the U.S. participation rate and the decline in the
Canadian rate, other structural factor may not
have been important for this age group. In fact, an
examination of the developments in the move-
ments in the participation rates of students and
non-students, suggests cyclical factors played the
dominant role.
The job-seeking experience of Canadian stu-
dents aged 20-24 was relatively good in the 1990s.
Their employment rate remained close to its 1990
peak level, which may explain the small rise in
their participation rate. Nevertheless, that rise in
the student participation rate in the 1990s pales in
comparison with what took place in the 1980s,
when their participation rate rose along with their
school attendance rate. The rise in the participa-
tion rate for students in the 1980s can be attrib-
uted to the upward trend of tuition fees and the
downward trend in government support in the
form of grants. The persistence of these trends in
the 1990s should have spelled further increases in
the participation rate for students. The flattening
that occurred indicates a deterioration of job op-
portunities for older students in the 1990s com-
pared with the 1980s, even though their job-
search experience was more successful than that
of teenagers and slightly better than that of the
core labour force. The contrasting performance of
the summer participation rate in the 1980s and
1990s for young adults is further evidence of that
deterioration (Chart 9).
In contrast with the experience of Canadian
students, the participation rate for young adults
who are not in school fell in the 1990s. Most of
this decline appears to be cyclical. The fact that
part-time employment has become more com-
mon among these non-students suggests the de-
cline was the result of a deterioration in labour
market conditions for this group (Statistics Can-
ada, 1997).28 Although the participation rate has
begun to recover recently, in 1997 it was still 1.6
percentage points below its 1989 peak.
The participation rates of the 20-24 age group
followed employment rates more closely in the
1990-91 than in the 1980-81 recession, in both
countries, particularly for women, Since about
1994, only the participation rate for U.S. men has
been at odds with the employment rate perform-
ance. This development may be because of the
higher percentage of students, with weaker at-
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in the population and, in Canada, the changes in
EI eligibility may also be loosening the attach-
ment of this age group to the labour force. The re-
lationship between the Canadian participation
and employment rates may, therefore, become
even closer in the future.
Primarily because of the higher school atten-
dance rate in 1997 than in 1989, a large part of
which appears to be permanent, an increase of no
more than three to four percentage points from
1996 to 2006 appears likely. The maintenance of
all the gains in the attendance rate would, by it-
self, preclude a return of the participation rate to
the peak level reached in 1989. Although the par-
ticipation rates for Canadian students and non-
students can be expected to continue to make cy-
clical gains, the gap between the participation and
the employment rates may shrink toward that of
the United States, in response to changed EI rules.
In contrast with this projection, the BLS is project-
ing a decline of 2.6 percentage points for this
group by 2006 in the United States (Fullerton,
1997: Table 4).
Older workers: Ages 55 and over
The most striking characteristics of participa-
tion rates for workers aged 55 and over in both
countries are the dramatic decline in the male rate
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s and the
close relationship between participation and em-
ployment rates, indicating a weak attachment to
the labour force (Chart 11).29 Both the employ-
ment and participation rates for men in the two
countries ended their decline in the 1990s, and
have even risen slightly in the United States. Par-
ticipation rates for women, which are much lower
in Canada than in the United States, exhibited a
very weak downward trend until 1986. Since
then, these rates have diverged even more as the
U.S. rate ratcheted upward. The long-term nature
of the downward trend in this older group’s par-
ticipation rates suggests structural factors have
been more important than cyclical forces in their
labour market decisions. It is even difficult to find
a purely cyclical reason for the recent change in
the trend in the male rates.
There is a great deal of variation in participa-
tion rate patterns among the various age groups
that make up the aggregate 55 and over group. For
example, the rate for youngest sub-group of
women (aged 55-59) rose decisively in the 1980s.
Since the same group has been exhibiting compa-
rable behaviour in the United States, it appears
the ratcheting-up phenomenon of women’s par-
ticipation rates may be affecting this age group
and, may affect the 60-64 age group eventually.
In the United States, a new development ap-
pears to be taking place that may be a harbinger
for Canada. The change in direction in the partici-
pation rate for U.S. men aged 55 and over was
caused by an increase of more than two percent-
age points from 1986 to 1996 in the rate for the
65-75 age group.30 Since the rise continued
throughout the recession, when for most other
U.S. male groups it declined, it appears to be
structural. In Canada, the participation rate for
males aged 65-69 stopped falling in the 1990s,
suggesting it may follow the new trend for older
American men.






























  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   11 To determine whether the change in the trend
of the male participation rate is permanent or if
the decline has merely been interrupted, it would
be necessary to identify the dominating influ-
ences on the timing of permanent withdrawal
from the work force. These factors would include
the state of workers’ health and sources of retire-
ment income (from personal wealth, employer re-
tirement plans and social security). The role of
education in the retirement decision might be ex-
pected to be important, but at the present time,
the evidence is inconclusive.
While the improvements in various measures
of social security aimed at the elderly have no
doubt enabled a growing proportion of older peo-
ple to drop out of the labour force, the provision of
public pensions does not always have that effect.
People may “retire” but still opt to work, perhaps
at reduced hours, if there is no earnings penalty.
Unlike in the case of social security in the United
States, there is no restriction or tax on work in or-
der to receive the Canada or Quebec Pension
Plans.31 Changes in Canada, such as the introduc-
tion of cost-of- living indexation and an early re-
tirement option, have made early retirement more
attractive since the 1970s32 but there is little evi-
dence of any substantial effect on labour market
decisions from early retirement options in public
pension plans in Canada (Baker and Benjamin,
1997:16). It should be remembered that a large
percentage of CPP/QPP beneficiaries do not qual-
ify for the maximum pension ($744.79 a month
for both CPP and QPP as of July 1, 1998) when
they become eligible to claim benefits. Many peo-
ple have not accumulated the maximum number
of years and may, therefore, increase their average
pension by working longer. Others may be able to
replace years when earnings were low with years
at, or close to, the maximum. While disincentives
to remaining in the labour force are built into the
CPP/QPP, they may affect only those whose in-
comes would be marginally higher than the pen-
alty level. Higher-income individuals (who likely
also have post-secondary education) may have
greater motivation to remain in the work force be-
cause their opportunity cost of retiring is very
large. One study of the relationship between so-
cial security and retirement in the United States
found that the influence of social security provi-
sions on retirement planning varied according to
such factors as marital status and earnings. For
example, there was a disincentive for workers
with low earnings to continue work after age 61
but a large incentive for high-earnings workers to
continue to work from 62 to 64 (Diamond and
Gruber, 1997:24-25).
Rather than social security availability being a
major incentive to withdraw from the labour
force, especially before age 65, a combination of
factors such as economic conditions, industrial
restructuring and the availability of employer-
provided pension plans, may be more influential.
For example, for U.S. workers who were covered
by both private-sector pension plans and social
security, decisions to withdraw from the labour
force were found to be influenced more by the em-
ployer pension plans (Wise, 1996:3). A Canadian
survey of people not in the labour force provided
evidence that older workers, who are subject to
downsizing, may choose to leave the labour force
rather than start a new career. The number of
workers who made this decision because of lay-
offs, plant closures or voluntary early retirement
options during the 1990-92 recession was about
two thirds larger than the number that left for
these reasons in 1987-89 (Siroonian, 1993 and
Gower, 1997:11). This development suggests
structural change may cause the cyclical effect to
be greater than otherwise.
Evidence for the role of education in the retire-
ment decision is both scant and mixed. An analy-
sis of Canadian LFS data for 1991-95 found those
with a postsecondary diploma or degree retired
earlier than those with eight years of schooling or
less (Gower, 1997). Evidence for the United
States, however, suggests people with more
schooling are more likely to continue working
past age 55. In fact, in the United States the par-
ticipation rate for those who have completed four
years or more of college has begun to rise in recent
years (Besl and Kale, 1996). It is possible the Ca-
nadian findings are a temporary phenomenon, re-
flecting the generous early retirement options
that, in the 1990s, have been a feature of many
restructuring efforts in sectors where employees’
levels of education tend to be high, e.g. education
and public administration. Later retirement
among those with the least schooling may be be-
cause of inadequate pension entitlements or per-
sonal wealth. Many of these people would not
even be eligible for the maximum CPP/QPP pen-
sion. Canada may, therefore, see a similar turn-
around in the participation rate for higher edu-
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predict for the United States.
Government policy and social and economic
developments appear to be causing the change of
direction in the participation rate of the 55-plus
group in the United States and may have a similar
impact in Canada in the future. These include
less-generous retirement support by private and
public sectors and a higher percentage of older
women who need to be financially independent,
after three decades of increased incidence of mar-
riage breakdown (Besl and Kale, 1996). Other
likely influences on the decision by Americans
about when to leave the workforce mentioned by
Besl and Kale are legislation eliminating manda-
tory retirement and outlawing age discrimination,
fiscal constraints on the growth in Social Security
benefits and the operation of medicare, which is
projected to run out of funds before 2002, and
regulations implemented over time to raise the
normal retirement age for full Social Security
benefits from 65 to 67. All these considerations
lead Besl and Kale to expect higher labour force
participation rates among older adults in the next
century. Labour force projections that assume
that participation rates for those aged 55 and older
will remain at the current low levels may be overly
pessimistic and may underestimate the size of the
future labour force.
Finally, the rising trend in the ratio of the self-
employed to total employment may have a signifi-
cantly positive effect on the participation rate,
since these people tend to retire later than salaried
employees (Gower, 1997).33 The acceleration in
the growth of this ratio in the mid-1990s may,
however, be temporary to the extent that self-em-
ployment was a second-best solution for some of
those who took early retirement as part of the
massive reduction in employment in the public
sector.
A plausible outcome for the 55-plus age group
in Canada would be a relatively strong increase —
as much as four to five percentage points — be-
tween 1996 and 2006. This compares with the
BLS projection for the United States of a rise of 6.5
percentage points for this age group over the same
period (Fullerton, 1997).
Conclusion
This article has attempted to develop a synthe-
sis of various pieces of information about past
structural influences on the participation rates of
Canada and the United States with a view to hy-
pothesizing how much potential underlying
strength there is over the next few years.
Compositional and structural factors appear to
have played a significant role in the decline in the
participation rate in Canada over the 1990s and in
the different performance between the two coun-
tries. Rough estimates of the effect of the shifts in
weights of demographic groups in the working
age population and between students and non-
students appear to account for one to 1.5 percent-
age points of the 2.69 percentage point decline
from 1989 to 1997, or 37 per cent to 56 per cent.
This is not a minor effect and strongly suggests it
was unreasonable to expect the participation rate
to have regained the peak level of 67.5 per cent
during this time. Compositional effects also ap-
pear to account for about 30 per cent of the differ-
ence between in the change in the two countries’
participation rates over the period.
In addition, structural factors such as the con-
vergence of female participation rates to male
rates and a continued trend in early retirements
among 55 and over males have all helped to put
downward pressure on the aggregate participa-
tion rates.
Over the next decade, Canada, as well as the
United States and many other members of the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation & Develop-
ment, will experience a rising population share of
older people, who have on average the lowest par-
ticipation rates of the major groups. This change
in composition would result in a decline in the ag-
gregate participation rate without offsetting in-
creases in the participation rates of age- pecific
groups (Chart 5). There is unlikely to be a much
larger increase in the school attendance rate, as in
the case of teens it appears to be approaching a
saturation point. However, because a large pro-
portion of the increase appears to have been
structural, the impact will be permanent.
In the case of the largest group — core-age
workers — the participation rate appears to have
room to increase moderately. As workers enter
the core-age group with higher levels of education
than those leaving it, there may be a better match
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velopment may end the decline in the rates for
men and may help to further narrow the gap be-
tween the rates for men and women, albeit at a
slower pace than in the 1970s and 1980s. There is,
however, a possibility that participation rates for
women will rise to a higher level in Canada than
in the United States. The participation rate for
teens is likely to make some large gains in the face
of continued economic expansion, but the small
weight of this group will also keep the impact on
the aggregate rate relatively small. In the case of
young adults, the room for cyclical gains is quite
large but, again, their weight in the population is
relatively small. The participation rate for older
workers could well increase further, although the
greatest uncertainty surrounds this group’s par-
ticipation rates.
Structural and demographic factors will likely
prevent the aggregate participation rate from re-
turning to its 1989 peak before 2006, but the fac-
tors exerting upward pressure on the participation
rate are likely to outweigh those that are pulling it
down.
Another feature of the aggregate participation
rate that appears likely to emerge is a greater pro-
pensity for the participation rate to react to a
change in the employment rate, closer to the U.S.
experience. This results partly from the rising
weight in the population of groups whose partici-
pation rates tend to vary closely with the corre-
sponding employment rate, e.g. students and
those aged 55 and over. In addition, the decline in
the proportion of the unemployed who qualify for
EI may produce a reduction in the labour force at-
tachment of some groups, such as seasonal work-
ers, and an increased responsiveness to changes
in the employment rate.
Taking into account all the developments and
factors that seem to be influencing the outcome
for each Canadian group examined, plausible pro-
jections have been made for eight age/sex groups.
The rates are then weighted by their projected
population shares to estimate what the aggregate
Canadian participation rate might be in 2006.
These projections are summarized in Table 2 with
those made by the BLS in its most recent biennial
employment outlook (Fullerton, 1997). These es-
timates suggest the aggregate participation rate
could rise to more than 66.5 per cent by 2006,
compared with 64.9 per cent in 1996. That would
still be a percentage point below the U.S. pro-
jected rate although the projected rise for Canada
between 1996 and 2006 is about double the U.S.
rise. Considerable uncertainty, however, sur-
rounds many of the assumptions underlying this
projection.
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search Department at the Bank of Can-
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are Senior Analysts in the Research De-
partment at the Bank of Canada.
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are solely responsible for the paper’s content, none of
the above mentioned is responsible for any remaining
errors. No responsibility for errors should be attributed
to the Bank of Canada. An earlier version of this paper
was delivered to the Congress of the Canadian Economic
Association, University of Ottawa, May 30, 1998.




Canada 15-19  47.3 48.1 57.0
U.S. 16-19  52.3 52.8 51.8
Canada 20-24  75.5 76.0 79.5
U.S. 20-24  76.8 77.4 74.3
Canada males 25-54 91.0 91.3 92.3
U.S. males 25-54. 91.8 91.8 90.8
Canada females 25-54  74.7 77.3 81.0
U.S. females 25-54  76.1 76.5 79.3
Canada males 55+  32.7 32.9 37.5
U.S. males 55+  38.3 39.05 43.8
Canada females 55+  16.8 17.3 21.1
U.S. females 55+  23.9 25.0 29.9
Aggregate
Canada 64.9 65.1 66.6
U.S. 66.8 67.1 67.6
  14  Canadian Business Economics   Summer 1999 1. The growth of population aged 15 and over, which is
a function of birth and death rates and net immigra-
tion, interacts with changes in the participation rate
to determine the growth of the labour force.
2. Dugan and Robidoux (1999) take a similar approach.
In contrast with an earlier article (Ip, King and Ver-
dries,1998), this article has an explicit Canada-U.S.
comparison, puts more weight on compositional fac-
tors, and less on cyclical factors. The use of annual
averages and data for all of 1998, produces somewhat
different calculations and estimations.
3. Archambault and Grignon (1999) were unable to use
educational cost variables because of data limitations.
4. Except where noted, sources of data are Statistics Can-
ada and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
5. Note that population shares are not perfectly compa-
rable between Canada and the United States because
of the inclusion of 15-year-olds in the Canadian fig-
ures. The United States population is defined to in-
clude people aged 16 years and older.
6. These calculations do not take into account the effect
of the changes in age composition of the aggregate
rate.
7. The calculation varies somewhat with the number of
age/sex groups used. This estimation uses 12 groups
and 1989 participation rates. Dugan and Robidoux
(1999) used 16 groups for 1989 to 1996 to estimate a
contribution of -0.75 or about 28 per cent of the total
drop. Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) took account of
the age composition effect but only for female partici-
pation rates on which they find only a small effect on
“recent changes”. In addition the estimation period
does not include 1995 to 1997.
8. Their explanation is the earlier aging of the U.S. popu-
lation.
9. In 1997 the participation rate for non-students was 78
per cent, while for students it was 35 per cent.
10. Although for the United States the measure is an en-
rolment rate, the term “attendance” is used through-
out for simplicity.
11. Jennings (1998) attributes a further 38 per cent of the
decline in the youth participation rate from 1989 to
1997 to the fall in full-time student participation rates
and 11 per cent to the fall in non-student participation
rates.
12. Teens 16-19 have been used for comparison purposes
with the United States.
Data for Canada are for attendance at school but for
the United States the measure is enrolment in school.
Thus, there could be a small upward bias in the U.S.
measure relative to the Canadian rate.
U.S. school enrolment statistics are based on replies
to the Current Population Survey interviewer’s inquiry
whether the person was enrolled in regular school.
Such schools include elementary and high schools,
colleges, universities, and professional schools but ex-
clude those that are not in the regular school system,
such as trade schools, business colleges and schools
for the mentally handicapped, which do not advance
students to regular school degrees. Attendance may
be on full- or part-time (U.S. Department of Com-
merce, 1995).
For Canada, school attendance statistics are based on
replies to the LFS interviewer’s inquiry about whether
the person was attending any educational estab-
lishment (primary, secondary, community college,
junior college, CEGEP, university or others) either full-
or part-time and taking credit courses toward a degree,
diploma or certificate.
We thank Deborah Sunter of Statistics Canada, Labour
Force Survey Division for providing data for the 16-19
and 20-24 age groups for both countries for 1989 and
1997.
13. The unemployment rate in the U.S. for those with less
than a high school diploma was 8.1 per cent in 1997
compared with 2 per cent for those with a college
degree.
14. The OECD (1997) found that even though the supply
of workers with low education levels generally fell
between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, their la-
bour-market situation worsened in most countries.
15. The indicators used for these estimates are not entirely
consistent, relying on full- and part time attendance
rates in the Canadian/U.S. differences and on Jen-
nings estimates, which use full-time rates. Thus, they
should be interpreted as simply an indication of the
possible effect of the fall in attendance rates.
16. See Card and Riddell (1996) for a discussion of the
role of EI and labour force attachment. The broader
definition of job-seeking in Canada than in the United
States also increases the probability that someone who
is not working, will be included in the labour force.
17. This estimate uses information from Macredie (1996),
18. Fullerton (1997) notes, in passing, the paucity of re-
search on the long-term decrease in participation rates
of core-aged men.
19. Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) found the flattening of
the female participation rate in the 1990s is primarily
a structural phenomenon.
20. Hayghe (1997) notes that, in the United States, the
participation rates for most groups of women in the
25-54 age group rose in the 1970s and 1980s, but that
growth was greatest for mothers of children under age
18.
21. The average time per year spent in the labour force by
women had been nine months in 1960. See Motley,
1996.
22. In a recent survey, Statistics Canada found women
were more likely than men to feel overqualified for
their jobs. In 1994, 24 per cent of women with a degree
or college diploma were likely to have a clerical or
service job compared with 8 per cent of men. “One
possible explanation is that more women than men
may accept jobs with lower-level requirements in or-
der to balance family demands and earning an in-
come.” Kelly, Howatson-Leo and Clark (1997). Also,
a much larger proportion of women than men work
part-time.
  Summer 1999  Canadian Business Economics   15 23. Since 1976 the size of these two population groups
has been roughly equal in Canada but, because the
teen participation rate is much lower, their share of
the labour force is less than 6 per cent compared with
10 per cent for the older group.
24. In Canada, 95 per cent of 15- to 16-year-olds are at-
tending school, compared to 97 per cent in the United
States; for 17- to 19-year-olds the figures are about 70
per cent in Canada and 71 per cent in the United States.
Statistics Canada (1997) and Census Bureau (1995).
25. A Statistics Canada review of youths and the labour
market notes the school to work transition has become
more difficult for this group in the 1990s. The employ-
ment rate for non-student youths (15-24) has fallen
from 73.2 per cent in 1992 to 69.2 per cent in 1996.
Statistics Canada (1997)
26. An international literacy survey done in 1994, and in
which Canada participated, found Canadians in the
labour force who were at the lowest level of literacy
had a significantly higher level of unemployment than
those who were at the highest level of literacy. The
differences were similar on three scales, prose, docu-
ment and quantitative (Statistics Canada, HDRC and
National Literacy Secretariat, 1996).
27. Archambault and Grignon (1999) found the minimum
wage relative to the industrial wage had a significant
negative impact on youth participation rates, particu-
larly of students. Other studies in the U.S. in the 1990s
have found a rise in the minimum wage appeared to
increase employment. See Card, David and Alan B.
Kreuger (1994).
28. In addition, the percentage of youth (15-24) who
worked part-time because that was all they could find
rose dramatically from 1990 to 1995 (Gordon Betcher-
man and Norm Leckie, 1997).
29. The fact that since 1976 people aged 65 and over have
been ineligible to participate in the EI/UI program may
be one reason why participation rates have such a
close relationship with employment rates.
30. Fullerton (1997:29) observes the participation rate for
this group had been trending down continuously since
1890.
31. In order to qualify for the QPP or CPP between the
ages of 60 and 65, the applicant must have “substan-
tially” stopped working, but there is no subsequent
restriction on earnings or hours of work for pension
recipients. There has been no restriction on applicants
between 65 and 70 since 1975.
32. The phase-in period for the CPP/QPP ended in 1976.
Indexation was introduced in Canada in the 1970s and
the early retirement option (age 60-64) was introduced
to the QPP in 1984 and to the CPP in 1987. In the
United States, an early retirement option (ages 62-65)
was introduced in 1956 for women and in 1961 for
men.
33. The large proportion of self-employed in Japan helps
to explain the high participation rate for older Japa-
nese (Takashi Oshio and Naohiro Yashiro, 1997).
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